This paper proposes an integrated framework to address three empirical findings of the literature on initial public offerings. Investors are aware of this process and subscribe only if their expected profits are non-negative. As a result, issuers offer high spreads to induce banks to set high prices, allowing them profits. We show that in equilibrium superiorly informed VC backed issuers impose smaller spreads but face larger underpricing than non-VC backed issuers.
Introduction
backed IPOs exhibit greater average underpricing (Francis and Hasan (2001) ). Why would an experienced player forego more revenue than supposedly less experienced non-VC issuers? Appealing to 'experience' or 'repeated interaction' cannot explain why lower spreads and higher underpricing occur jointly. In our model, however, this arises as a natural result of the information revelation procedure in the offering process.
In general, the interaction between issuer and bank, the structure of contracts written, and the information published by either party may provide investors with valuable insights about a company's potential market value. In this paper we develop a theoretical model that strives to integrate the strategic interaction between issuer and bank (namely with respect to the choice of the gross spread level and the offer price) with investors' reactions to the information revealed in the process. In contrast to a (theory-free) empirical analysis, a theoretical model can establish intuitive causality and provide an integrated understanding. Furthermore, good theory can intrinsically generate and thus explain several 'puzzling' phenomena in a unified, parsimonious set-up, while at the same time create additional testable predictions.
In the IPO process, there are three major players: the issuer, the bank, and investors. Each will react rationally to preceding actions by other players and/or in anticipation of a rational response. The only meaningful way to model this situation is as an extensive form game. Furthermore, in IPOs there is substantial uncertainty and thus it is reasonable to model asymmetric, noisy information that is correlated among agents. Finally, the aftermarket price should aggregate information that the offer price could not -why else would we often observe substantial price-jumps? The nature of the problem therefore requires a model that incorporates three-player strategic considerations coupled with informational asymmetries. We thus set up our model as a three-step signaling game, with market prices that aggregate more information than offer prices.
There are drawbacks to this approach: The analysis of any three player game is intrinsically complex. However, complexity is a price worth paying: The model accomplishes to exactly integrate the above described stylized facts. In addition, we derive two novel, testable implications. First, house-bank 3 backed IPOs should have the highest spreads and, second, for same-class IPOs (i.e. VC or non-VC) the level of the spread has no impact on underpricing. We assume that banks, investors, and some classes of issuers have private but noisy information about the intrinsic value of the offered security which is either 'good news' or 'bad news'. In a wider sense, this signal can also be understood as information about market sentiment. Banks strategically choose the offer price to maximize their expected profits from the gross spread of the offer revenue. A higher price does not necessarily increase revenue: at high prices the IPO can fail as there may not be enough investors to buy up the entire offering. Prior to the pricing decision the issuer offers the bank a contract that specifies the gross spread level. This level critically affects the bank's pricing decision. Given the contract variables, the bank sets a price that, first, either reveals (separation) or camouflages (pooling) its private information and, second, is either low so that all investors order (risk free) or high so that only investors with 'good news' order (risky) . If the issuer is also privately informed, the spread level can, likewise, be either separating or pooling. Banks, in turn, account for the spread's information content when deciding on the offer price. Anticipating the bank's pricing decision, the issuer sets the level of the gross spread strategically so that the bank sets the offer price that gives the issuer the highest expected profit. Investors are aware of this process and subscribe only if their expected profits are non-negative. We show that at the equilibrium spread the bank makes positive profits.
For informed issuers we consider two cases: In the first, the issuer receives a private signal that is conditionally independent from the bank's signal (later interpreted as VC backed IPOs). In the second case, the issuer's signal is perfectly correlated with the bank's signal ('house-bank'). In the first case, the issuer does not reveal his private information and sets a pooling spread that hides his signal. Nevertheless, the spread is set so that the bank separates in prices. In the second case, an issuer with favorable information sets a spread that prevents its low-signal counterpart from mimicking. Spreads are thus separating and also indicate the bank's signal. Therefore, prices cannot carry additional information. With uninformed issuers (later interpreted as non-VC backed IPOs), obviously, the spread cannot convey information. We show that equilibrium spreads are then set so that both types of the bank pool in the offer price. The pooling spreads with independently informed issuers (VC backed) are lower than the spread set by an uninformed issuer (non-VC backed). Furthermore, if bank's and issuer's signals are perfectly correlated, spreads are, on average, the highest.
Finally, we show that the model is consistent with the empirical findings on first-day returns. In equilibrium there is, on average, underpricing, and it is more pronounced in VC than in non-VC backed offerings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 summarizes the equilibrium outcomes and discusses the underlying assumptions. Section 4 derives the equilibrium prices set by the bank. Section 5 analyzes the strategic choice of the spread level by uninformed and superiorly informed issuers. Section 6 presents the main results on levels and differences of gross spreads.
A Stylized Model of the IPO Procedure
The Security. The security on offer can take one of two equally likely values V ; for simplicity V ∈ V = {0, 1}. The realization is not known to any player in the game.
The Investors. There are N > S identical, risk neutral investors who can place unit orders of the security. Each investor receives a costless, private, conditionally i.i.d. signal s i ∈ V about the value of the security. This information is noisy, i.e. Pr(s i = v|V = v) = q i with q i ∈ ( 1 2 , 1). If he receives a share, the investor's payoff is the market price minus the offer price, otherwise it is zero. An investor's type is his signal, thus a 'high-signal investor' has s i = 1, a 'low-signal investor has s i = 0.
The Issuer. In general the issuer can be either informed or uninformed. For the latter we consider two subcases: in the first, the issuer (firm) receives a private signal s f ∈ {0, 1}, in the second, the issuer and the bank receive the identical signal. Any signal is costless and conditionally independent from the investors' signals but, for simplicity, of the same quality, i.e. Pr(s i = v|V = v) = q. The uninformed issuer receives no signal. We will refer to these types of issuers as 'privately informed', 'identically informed', and 'uninformed'. In Section 6 we interpret the meaning of informative signals and relate informed and uninformed issuers to real-world types such as VC backed and non-VC backed issuers. The issuer is risk neutral and signs a contract with a bank that delegates the pricing decision and constitutes the amount of securities, S, to be sold. It also specifies the publicly observed gross spread level β ∈ (0, 1).The issuer chooses this spread.
4 If the offer is floated, his profit is fraction (1 − β) of the offer revenue, otherwise it is zero. Investment Banks. The single risk neutral bank receives a private signal s b ∈ V about the value of the security. This signal is noisy and conditionally independent from investors' signals. Yet it is more informative, i.e. q b > q i , where Pr(s b = v|V = v) = q b . If s b = 1 we refer to the bank as a 'high-signal bank', for s b = 0, it is a 'low-signal bank'. The bank receives the signal after the contract (which we will show it always accepts) has been signed and then announces the offer price p. If the offer fails, the bank incurs cost C.
5 These costs are external to our formulation and to be thought of as reputational loss or opportunity costs resulting from lost market share subsequent to a failed IPO.
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Without loss of generality, we do not specify any costs the offering procedure itself may cause for the investment bank. Thus, if the offer is successful, the bank's payoff is βpS; if 4 Another candidate choice variable is the number of shares S, or even the number of potential investors N that are addressed, e.g. during the road-show. However, including these as choice variables would require a different, more elaborate modeling approach.
5 The model could be extended to allow the bank to buy up unsold securities. Costs then result from expensively bought inventory positions and not from failure. C would thus be 'smoothed'. This would not alter our qualitative results but complicate the analysis considerably.
6 Dunbar (2000) , for e.g., provides evidence that banks lose market share after withdrawn offerings.
The issuer offers a contract specifying the gross spread level.
The bank sets the offer price.
Investors decide whether to order or to abstain.
Shares are floated or offering fails. it fails, its payoff is −C. The timing of the game is summarized in Figure 1 . The Offer. A fixed number of S securities is offered at a fixed price p. If the demand d is insufficient, d < S, the offer fails and the security does not get listed. If d ≥ S, offer is successful. If it is oversubscribed, the share-allocation is pro-rated. After the distribution, demand d is revealed, and the security is traded on the market at market price p m .
Signaling Value of Gross Spread and Offer Price. The gross spread level and the offer price are announced first. Then investors decide whether to order, based on their private information and on the information that issuer and bank reveal about their signals through the gross spread level and the offer price. We denote information contained in prices by µ(p), information in spreads by ν(β). In case of the uninformed issuer, the spread is uninformative and only prices can carry information. In case of an identically informed issuer, the information contained in β is hierarchical to the information in p: Issuers with different signals may set different levels of the gross spread which then reveals the signal of the issuer and the bank. In this case, prices cannot carry further information. We write µ(p) = 1 if the price reflects that the bank's signal is s b = 1, µ(p) = 0 if reveals that s b = 0, and µ(p) = 1 2 to indicate that the price is uninformative; likewise for ν(β).
In equilibrium these will turn out to be the only relevant cases.
The Aftermarket Price. The equilibrium market price is determined by the aggregate number of investors' favorable signals. In our model this number is always revealed, either directly through investor demand or immediately after the float through trading activities. Thus write p m (d) for the market price as a function of the number of high-signal investors d ∈ {0, . . . , N }. Appendix A fleshes out this argument.
Investors' Decisions and Expected Payoffs. We admit only symmetric pure strategies; thus all investors with the same signal take identical decisions. These can then be aggregated so that only three cases need to be considered: First, all investors subscribe, second, only high-signal investors subscribe, and third, no investor subscribes.
To compute his expected payoff, an investor has to account for the probability of receiving the security. There are two cases to consider. First, all investors buy: Market demand is N and all investors receive the security with equal probability S/N . Second, only high-signal investors buy: If d investors buy, each receives the security with probability S/d. If overall demand d is smaller than the number of shares on offer, d < S, the IPO fails and investors who ordered the security get it with probability 0.
Investors order the security whenever their expected payoff from doing so is nonnegative. Suppose only high-signal investors buy. After observing gross spread and offer price, an investor's information set contains both his signal s i and the information inferred from offer price and spread, µ(p) and ν(β). Since signals are conditionally i.i.d., for every V ∈ V there is a different distribution over the number d of others' favorable signals (s i = 1). Investors combine these densities with their own signal to determine the number of others' favorable signals. An investor orders if at price p his rational-expectation payoff from buying is non-negative (details are in Appendix A),
Threshold Prices. Denote by p s i ,µ,ν the highest price that an investor with signal s i , price information µ(p) and spread information ν(β) is willing to pay in equilibrium if all investors with signals weakly larger than s i order. If the issuer is uninformed, ν is replaced with a diamond, ⋄. If issuer and bank get the same signal and if the issuer signals his private information, µ(p) is replaced with a diamond to indicate that the price cannot reveal further information. Suppose, the issuer reveals information ν. Then p 1,1,ν is the highest (price-separating) price with all high-signal investors buying, p 1, ,ν the highest (price-pooling) price with everyone buying, and p 0,0,ν the highest (price-separating) price with everyone buying. Note that at all these prices investors are aware that the security price may drop (or rise) in the aftermarket and that they may not get the security. The threshold prices are formally derived in Appendix C.
The Bank's Expected Payoff. With binary signals, the probability that d investors have the favorable signal and N − d have not, conditional on true value V , is binomial. The unconditional distribution, which convolutes the high and low value case, is bimodal. The bank is interested in the cumulative probability that there are at least S investors, given its own information and the information it derived from the spread. We use notation α s b ,ν (S) for this cumulative probability.; details of its functional form are in Appendix B. If the bank charges a price at which only high-signal investors buy, its expected profit is
When the offer price is low enough so that all investors are willing to buy, irrespective of their signals, then the offer never fails and payoffs are given by Π(p|all buy) = βpS. If the price is set so high that no investor buys, a loss of C results with certainty.
Equilibrium Outcomes
Any signaling game's equilibrium derivation, albeit indispensable and insightful, can be tedious at times. We thus list the important equilibrium outcomes before we derive them in detail. Some readers may want (in a first read) go straight to Section 6, which contains the important consequences that the equilibria yield. The Equilibrium Concept and Selection Criteria. The equilibrium concept for this signalling game is, naturally, the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). A common problem with signalling PBEs is the multiplicity of equilibria, some being supported by "unreasonable" out-of-equilibrium beliefs. The most intuitive equilibrium, however, should be the so-called "Riley"-outcome in which least surplus is lost through costly signalling. To single out this outcome, we only consider equilibria that satisfy Cho and Kreps (1987) 's Intuitive Criterion and, if this does not yield a unique outcome, we select the equilibrium that is payoff dominant for the agent who takes the signaling action.
The Equilibrium. The timing of the model is as described in Figure 1 . First, the issuer may receive its signal and then offers a spread-contract to the bank. The bank then sets the offer price given the spread, the information contained therein, and its own signal. Third, investors decide whether to order given all available information. Finally, in case the IPO takes place, the number of favorable signals is revealed in the aftermarket and the price adjusts according to it. Figure 2 illustrates the choices that issuer, bank and investors can make. The following outcomes can arise in equilibrium.
Summary (Equilibrium Predictions)
(1) If the issuer is uninformed, he will set a spread that induces banks to set a pooling price. At the pooling price, only investors with the high signal buy.
(2) If the issuer receives a private, conditionally independent signal, then he will set a spread which will not reflect his information but which will induce banks to play a separating equilibrium in prices. At the high separating price, only high-signal investors order, at the low separating price all investors order.
(3) If the issuer has the same signal as the bank, the gross spread level will reveal the issuer's information. Both the high-and the low-signal issuer will set spreads that lead to prices at which only high-signal investors order.
The equilibrium is derived by backward induction.
In the next section we analyze the price setting of the bank given the level of the gross spread. In Section 5 we derive each type of issuer's choice of the spread in anticipation of the bank's price setting. Section 6 interprets the findings of Sections 4 and 5 and presents our main results on banking profits and differences in spreads between different classes of issuers.
Simplifying Assumptions. There are four restrictive assumptions. We make these assumptions for two reasons. First, we want to keep the analysis tractable, so we strive to obtain (approximate) closed form solutions for success-probabilities and prices. The first three assumptions allow this. Second, we wish to keep our statements concise, and thus we make the fourth assumption where we restrict the gross spread level not to exceed 10 percent -which corresponds to empirically observed levels. The unconditional distribution over favorable signals is a composite of the two conditional distributions and thus bimodal. The two modes of the distribution over favorable signals are centered around N (1 − q) and N q. We now require
Nothing speaks against an analysis with a different number of shares (as long as the number is below N/2). But in this case the entire model can only be solved numerically.
The analysis is complicated as it is, and this assumption is conceptually innocuous.
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For every signal quality q, there exists anÑ (q) so that for all N >Ñ (q) the two conditional distributions over favorable signals generated by V = 0 and V = 1 do not 'overlap'. By standard results from statistics, a sufficient condition forÑ (q) is given bỹ
Assumption 2 The number of investors N is larger thanÑ (q).
As a consequence of the second assumption we can apply the Law of Large Numbers (LLN) and DeMoivre-Laplace's Theorem. 8 Since we assume that the IPO fails whenever d < S, Assumption 1 implies, for instance, if the spread is uninformative, i.e. ν = 1/2, then α 0, 1 2 (S) = (2 − q)/2 and α 1,
In what follows we thus omit S. A consequence of the LLN is that p m (d) ∈ {0, 1} for almost all values of d. 9 That is, market prices will be fully informative and almost surely reflect the true value.
Assumption 3 Signals are sufficiently precise, q ∈ (.6, 1).
Typically one assumes that signal quality exceeds .5, we require it to be larger than .6. When signals are very imprecise, our closed form approximation for prices can longer be applied and consequently the equilibrium analysis becomes very tedious. Essentially, we cannot make a conclusive statement about equilibria when signals approach being uninformative. In the spirit of positive economics, we restrict attention to cases where we can make predictions. The same applies to the fourth assumption:
Assumption 4 Spreads β are sufficiently small.
Empirically, observed spreads are typically between 2 percent and 9 percent, in this sense, our analysis is not unreasonable as we focus on empirically observed outcomes of spreads β below 10 percent. In a theoretical model, however, there are no grounds to restrict attention to any set of parameters. But again, if we allow spreads to be too large, the analysis becomes inconclusive. Equilibrium spreads depend on three parameters: Costs C, the number of potential investors N and signal precision q. Restricting β thus results in implicitly restricting the ratio of C to N for any q.
7 Allowing S to be the issuers' or banks' choice variable is a different matter. In this case, there would be a two-dimensional signal and conceptually this changes the model substantially.
8 For instance, the mode of a binomial distribution is generally not exactly symmetric. However, if N is large enough, we can apply DeMoivre-LaPlace (0 < q ± 2 q(1 − q)/N < 1) and employ the normal distribution instead. Thus we can treat each mode to be symmetric. 9 To be more precise,
Thus to get interesting equilibria, it is necessary that S is strictly smaller than N/2. If it was not, an IPO where only s i = 1 investors buy, would never be at risk of being overpriced as it fails in all overpriced cases.
Investment Banks' Equilibrium Price Choice
There are two cases to consider: First, spreads are uninformative or reflect the issuer's independent information. In that case, the bank plays a signaling game and needs to decide whether or not to reveal its private information. Second, in case of the identically informed issuer, spreads can reveal the bank's signal. Then the bank has no strategic decision problem but merely chooses the price that is optimal given all public information.
Uninformative Spreads or Spreads Reflecting the Issuer's Independent Signal
In the following we identify the conditions under which a profit maximizing bank reveals its information through the offer price. A separating equilibrium is defined as informationally efficient since investors can derive the bank's signal from the offer price. Hence a pooling equilibrium is informationally inefficient. In this case, investors decide only on the basis of their private signals. In what follows we take the information that may be contained in spreads, ν(β), as given. Separation and pooling thus always refers to prices.
A pooling equilibrium in prices is specified through (i) an equilibrium offer price p * from which investors infer (ii) price-information µ = , and (iii) investors' best replies given their private signals, µ, and p * . A separating equilibrium in prices is (i) a system of prices {p * ,p * } and price-information such that (ii) at p * =p * , the high separation price, the price-information is that the bank has the favorable signal, µ = 1, at p * = p * , the low separation price, the price-information is that the bank has the low signal, µ = 0, and (iii) investors' best replies given their private signals, µ, andp * or p * . In both separating and pooling equilibrium, for p ∈ {p * , p * } or p = p * , respectively, out-of-equilibrium public beliefs are chosen 'appropriately'. The following result is a straightforward consequence of signaling, the proof of which is in Appendix B.
Lemma 1 (The Highest Possible Low Separating Price) There exists no PBE (price-)separating offer price p * > p 0,0,ν .
In any separating equilibrium, therefore, the low price must be such that all investors buy, and the highest such separating price, given price-information µ = 0, is p
In what follows we refer to p 0,0,ν as the low separation price. In our setting there are three types of price-signaling equilibria: The already mentioned separating equilibrium, a pooling equilibrium in which only high-signal investors buy, and a pooling equilibrium in which all investors buy. In the following, we characterize the conditions guaranteeing that only separating equilibria survive our selection criterion.
,ν ], the interval of potential pooling prices at which all investors would buy. Define φ 1,ν (p) as the price at which the high-signal bank would be indifferent between charging a risky price φ 1,ν (p) at which only high-signal investors buy, and a safe pooling price p with all investors buying. Formally,
Price φ 0,ν (p) is defined analogously for the low-signal bank. Thus price φ s b ,ν (p) is the lowest risky price that a bank with signal s b is willing to deviate to from safe price p. In what follows we refer to φ 1,ν (p) as the high-signal bank's deviation price, and to φ 0,ν (p) as the low-signal bank's deviation price. It is straightforward to see that the low-signal bank requires a higher price as compensation for risk taking, and that, the higher the pooling price, the higher the lowest profitable deviation price. In what follows we analyze equilibria depending on two conditions on primitives.
Condition 1
The high-signal bank's deviation price from the highest safe pooling price is not higher than the highest separating price,
Condition 2 The low-signal bank's deviation price from the low separating price is not smaller than the highest risky pooling price,
To denote investors' order decisions, we use the following notation: All investors subscribe, B 0,1 , only high-signal investors subscribe, B 1 , and no investor subscribes, B ∅ . Thus, the set of potential collective best replies is B := {B 0,1 , B 1 , B ∅ }.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Price Setting) (a) If both Condition 1 and 2 are fulfilled then the unique PBE that satisfies the IC is the separating equilibrium {(p
(b) If Condition 1 is not fulfilled then the only PBE that satisfies the IC and payoff dominance is the pooling equilibrium {(p
(c) If Condition 2 is not fulfilled then the only PBE that satisfies the IC and payoff dominance is the pooling equilibrium {(p
,ν , µ = 0, B 1 if p ≤ p 1,0,ν , B ∅ else)} in which only high-signal investors buy.
Condition 1 together with the intuitive criterion (IC) is necessary and sufficient to rule out pooling equilibria in which all investors buy, irrespective of their signals. Condition 2 ensures that there is no pooling where only investors with 'good news' buy. The IC itself ensures that the high-signal bank always charges the highest sustainable separating price. The high separation pricep * is the minimum of p 1,1,ν and φ 0,ν (p 0,0,ν ). The bank cannot charge more than p 1,1,ν , and it cannot credibly charge more than φ 0,ν (p 0,0,ν ) as otherwise the low-signal bank would deviate. Finally, since
,ν ) < p 1,1,ν , the high-signal bank is willing to separate. If Condition 1 is violated not even the high-signal bank wants to take the risk of setting a price where only high-signal investors buy. A separating price pair with all investors buying at both prices cannot be an equilibrium. The bank charging the lower price always had an incentive to deviate to the higher price since the success probability remains unchanged. Payoff dominance for banks together with the IC then ensures that the highest pooling price at which all investors buy results as the unique equilibrium outcome. If Condition 2 is violated also the low-signal bank wants to set a high price at which only high-signal investors buy. A separating price pair with only high-signal investors buying at both prices cannot be an equilibrium. Again, the bank charging the lower price always had an incentive to deviate. Under payoff dominance only the highest such pooling price survives as the unique equilibrium.
Spreads Reflecting the Issuer's Identical Signal
If an identically informed issuer reveals his information, the bank has no more control over the the price's signaling value -the information is already out. We signify this by including a diamond, ⋄, instead of µ(p) in threshold prices p s i ,⋄,ν . The bank continues to choose the price that, given its private information, maximizes expected profit. Now, however, a low-signal bank can no longer mimic a high-signal bank because investors have inferred the bank's signal form the spread.
Suppose the bank has signal s b = 0 and spread-information is 'bad news', ν(β) = 0. Then high-signal investors are not willing to pay more than p 1,⋄,0 , as risky price at which only investors with signal s i = 1 buy. Price p 0,⋄,0 is the highest safe price at which all investors buy. However, if the spread is high enough, the risk of a failing IPO may still be outweighed by expected potential gains. If the spread β s 0 is large enough so that
then the low-signal bank will choose risky price p 1,⋄,0 . The high-signal bank faces a similar choice: If the spread is too low, it would rather choose a safe price. Here, however, the highest riskless price is p 0,⋄,1 , as at this price investors with the low signal are willing to buy, given they believe that the bank's/issuer's signal is s b = 1. So the high-signal bank only chooses risky price p 1,⋄,1 if spread β s 1 is high enough to that
From (3) and (4) we can derive the respective threshold spreads
It is straightforward to check that the low signal-spread must be larger than the highsignal spread,
Consequently, if spreads are separating and sufficiently large, the bank will set risky prices.
The Issuer's Strategic Choice of the Gross Spread
As with the bank, the analysis is split into two parts. In the first, the issuer is uninformed and thus not involved in strategic signaling. He will set the spread such that the bank sets revenue-maximizing equilibrium prices. In the second part, the issuer does have private information, so he is involved in a signaling game. He anticipates the behavior of the bank, and sets spreads strategically to maximize his expected revenue.
Equilibrium Spreads if the Issuer is Uninformed
For the bank, the choice of equilibrium prices critically depends on Conditions 1 and 2 from Proposition 1. In the following we give an intuitive interpretation of the equilibrium outcome in terms of the gross spread, demonstrating how the spread affects these conditions. We then derive the uninformed issuer's decision about the spread level. As before we indicate that the issuer is uninformed by replacing ν with a diamond. An Intuitive Characterization of the Equilibrium. The concept of deviation prices φ s b ,⋄ is a convenient tool to describe restrictions. We will now reformulate Conditions 1 and 2 from Proposition 1 in terms of the gross spread β. This allows us to derive a simple linear descriptive characterization of the equilibrium. Consider first Condition 1, φ 1,⋄ (p 0,
then the separating equilibrium cannot be sustained and the pooling equilibrium in p 0,
prevails. In other words, if the gross spread is low then the incentive to set a high and thus 
there is separation: The low-signal bank always sets p * = p 0,0,⋄ , and the high-signal bank setsp
risky price is reduced whereas the cost of failure remains unchanged. The lower threshold value for β such that not even the high-signal bank sets a risky price is given by
Moreover, if β is so high that price separation is payoff-dominated
then a price-separating equilibrium, again, cannot be sustained and the price-pooling equilibrium in p 1,
,⋄ prevails. In this case the gross spread is so high that even the lowsignal bank is willing to take the risk of failure and set a high price at which only highsignal investors buy. For the high-signal bank it becomes too costly to uphold separation, i.e. it would have to lower the high separation price so much that it prefers pooling. This threshold value for a pooling β is given by
Finally, there exists aβ 
Strategic Choice of the Gross Spread. If the underlying issuer is uninformed, his strategic choice of spreads conveys no information. For every spread, however, the issuer knows the best response of both types of banks. Consequently, the issuer has to choose the level of the gross spread that maximizes his overall expected payoff. If he sets the spread too low, even a bank with favorable information chooses a low, risk-free price. If spreads are high, the issuers get a smaller share of the revenue. Furthermore, for large spreads the high-signal bank may be unable to set a separating price. Payoff dominance for the first mover (the issuer) ensures that out of all βs triggering separation or pooling, the issuer will always choose the smallest one. In particular, to get pooling in the riskfree price p 0,
,⋄ , the issuer can set spread 0. The issuer then has the choice between the following expected profits
,⋄ S,
in price-separation, low risk-free price-pooling, and high risky price-pooling, respectively. To find the equilibrium spreads, one has to compare the issuers' payoffs for given equilibrium spreads. For given parameters q, C, N , the issuer will always choose the spread with maximal expected payoffs.
1. Pooling in p 1,
,⋄ is better than separation if
2. Pooling in p 1,
,⋄ is better than pooling in p 0,
The above transformations make use of the closed form expressions for prices and success probabilities that were derived in Appendices C and B. There are essentially three free variables: q, N and C. We treat C/N , the costs per potential investors as one variable, since in all payoff conditions they always enter as a ratio. To check our results, we reformulate all conditions so that we can describe them as functions of C/N and q.
Furthermore, restricting β to be smaller than 10 percent allows to cap the functions that form the restrictions. Numerically it can easily be checked that for all q ∈ (.6, 1), if high risky pooling is better than separation, it is also better than low, riskless pooling.
Proposition 2 (Gross Spreads with Uninformed Issuers)
There is a unique equilibrium that satisfies the IC and payoff dominance: The uninformed issuer offers a contract with β = β p ⋄ and both types of bank set pooling offer price p 1,
The choice of β follows directly from the comparison of the respective expected profits. The resulting price-setting by investment banks follows from Proposition 1.
Equilibrium Spreads if the Issuer is Independently Informed
Suppose now that the issuer gets his own, private signal, s f , conditionally independent from all signals s i and s b . Then the signaling game has two stages. In the first, the issuer may or may not signal his information. Bank and investors incorporate this information.
In the second stage, the bank chooses its equilibrium price, which may or may not reveal the bank's private signal. There are multiple different constellations imaginable:
1. The issuer pools in spreads and the bank separates in prices, pools in a risk-less price p 0, The bank's equilibrium price setting given the spread-information is covered in Proposition 1, the issuer's optimal spread-choice, anticipating this reaction, is analyzed now. Analogously to Corollary 1 we can determine threshold levels for the gross spread such that investment banks just set the low pooling price, separating prices, or the high pooling price. The lowest spread that induces banks to set the low pooling price is still β = 0. The two other threshold levels are denoted by β s ν for separation and β p ν for risky pooling. The issuer's strategic choice of the spread follows from the comparison of the respective profits. As it turns out, there are no spread-separating equilibria -issuers always pool in the spread. Furthermore, the equilibrium pooling spread induces the bank to play a separating equilibrium in prices.
Proposition 3 (Gross Spreads with Independently Informed Issuers)
The unique equilibrium is a spread-pooling equilibrium: Both types of issuer offer a contract with β = β and all investors buy.
To prove the claim we proceed counterfactual: We describe spreads and price-choices in a spread-separating equilibrium and show that a spread-separating situation is not incentive compatible for the low-signal issuer. He would always deviate and mimic the high-signal issuer. The intuition is, that with separating spreads both low-and high-signal issuer prefer to play a spread that induces risky pooling prices; clearly a low-signal issuer would prefer the higher price. Furthermore, the high-signal issuer cannot defend his position by setting different spreads, even when trying to play a spread that induces separationpricing. We then show that only spread-pooling can result. There will be two candidates for spread-pooling: The first spread induces price-pooling, the second price-separation. However, only price-separation satisfies the IC. Details of the proof are in Appendix B.
Equilibrium Spreads if the Issuer is Identically Informed
If the issuer pools in spreads, price setting by banks is as in Subsection 4.1. If the spread, however, is informative the bank has no strategic considerations in its optimal price choice: Its signal is the same as the issuer's who has just revealed his information. The high-signal bank does not have defend itself against the low-signal bank's deviations. In Subsection 4.2 we have already described banks' price setting for this case.
Proposition 4 (Gross Spreads with Identically Informed Issuers)
There exists a unique equilibrium which is a spread-separating equilibrium:
(a) The identically informed low-signal issuer sets spread β s 0 and the bank sets price p 1,⋄,0 . Investors derive information ν(β) = 0, and only those with signal s i = 1 buy.
(b) The identically informed high-signal issuer sets spread β s 1 and the bank sets price p 1,⋄,1 . Investors derive information ν(β) = 1 and only those with signal s i = 1 buy.
We have derived the threshold spread in Subsection 4.2. The proof follows in three steps. First, we derive conditions under which each issuer is satisfied with the bank choosing a risky price at the proposed spreads β s 0 , β s 1 . The conditions will ensure that expected payoffs are higher than profits from setting zero spreads. In this step we will use that spreads must not exceed 10 percent. Second, we show that these spreads are proof to derivations, so that no type of issuer wants to mimic the other, and no type favors playing out of equilibrium spreads. Third we argue that with identically informed issuers there can be no pooling equilibrium (under the given restriction on β). Details are in Appendix B.
To summarize, if the issuers have the same signal as the bank, they play a separation equilibrium in which both low-and high-signal issuer set spreads at which the bank sets a risky price. Notice that this is the only informationally efficient case where prices contain all existing information. In the case with uninformed issuers, banks pool in prices; in the case with independently informed issuers, spreads are pooling.
Results, Interpretation and Discussion
We claimed to address three issues: First, why do banks make positive profits in a competitive market, and, second, why do VC backed IPOs have lower spreads? In the following we show that our model can help explain both phenomena. Furthermore, recent evidence shows that VC backed IPOs are more underpriced. As outlined in the introduction, this is puzzling, yet your model is in line with this finding. In addition, we address implications of the model on the level of spreads when a commercial bank conducts the IPO of a former client ('house-bank'), and on the correlation of the spread level and underpricing in 'same-class' (i.e. VC or non-VC) issues.
Positive Profits for Investment Banks
As it is hard to obtain direct data on banking profits, Chen and Ritter (2000) argue that there are economies of scale in underwriting IPOs, yet spreads do not differ in offerings with revenue between $20 million and $80 million. Since banks at least break even in small offerings large offerings must be profitable.
In this model, equilibrium spreads allow banks positive profits. Once issuers have set the level of the spread, banks can always set a low, riskless price at which all investors buy, so that they receive their revenue share with certainty. Issuers, on the other hand, have a keen interest that banks set high prices, as they receive almost always more than 90 percent of the revenue. At high prices, however, only high-signal investors buy, making such prices risky. Spreads, therefore, have to be sufficiently high so that banks are compensated for the risk of failure. This effect alone should leave them with zero expected profits. Moreover, spreads must be incentive compatible so that banks set high prices and do not deviate to a risk-free low price. A bank's expected profit, therefore, is always at least what it would gain by deviating to a low risk-free price. Since we assume that the offering procedure itself causes no costs, it follows that banks earn positive profits.
Proposition 5 (Positive Profits for Investment Banks)
Investment banks enjoy positive profits that will not disappear in the face of competition.
Suppose a competing bank offered to conduct an IPO at a lower spread than specified in the contract the issuer offered initially. The issuer would not accept: even though he would get a higher fraction of the revenue, a lower spread would trigger a different equilibrium price, leading to lower payoffs. In our model, banks have full discretion over the offer price. Issuers must, therefore, set incentive compatible spreads. In reality banks do not have full discretion over prices. Many offerings fail because issuer and bank cannot agree on the offer price.
10 However, the qualitative result does not hinge upon the assumption that banks have full discretion. Banks have a good deal of power when it comes to price setting, and this is all we need for the qualitative result to hold. Competition, however, may take place in features of the IPO contract that we do not model. Chen and Ritter (2000) , for example, report that over time the number of co-managers in IPOs and thus analyst coverage has increased. In fact, these findings complement our results nicely. While Chen and Ritter state that, apparently, issuers cannot negotiate the spread, we assert that they do not want to. Megginson and Weiss (1991) were the first to report that spreads are significantly lower in VC backed IPOs than in non-VC backed IPOs. They show for their sample of 640 IPOs between 1983 and 1987 that gross spreads for VC backed issuers amount to 7.4 percent whereas they are 8.2 percent for non-VC backed issuers. Francis and Hasan (2001) find smaller but significant differences as well.
VC Issuers set Lower Spreads than Non-VC Issuers
In a strict sense, signals provide information about the asset's true liquidation value. In a wider sense, signals can be seen as information about market sentiment -market prices determine an investor's payoff, the true liquidation value only affects market prices through the distribution of signals. In this way it is not unreasonable to assert that an issuer is uninformed whereas banks and investors are informed. Certainly, some entrepreneurs have little experience with financial markets. Venture capitalists, on the other hand, are financial institutions and so they should be able to assess market sentiment. As the venture capitalist usually holds all relevant control rights, we interpret the independently informed issuer to be a VC-backed issuer. The uninformed issuer we interpret to be the non-VC backed entrepreneur. In this model banks also hold private information.
Before setting the offer price they closely interact with investors, for example during the road show, and thus are informed about the market's valuation of the firm on offer.
Proposition 6 (VC Backed Issuers set Lower Gross Spreads) VC backed issuers set lower levels of the gross spread than non-VC backed issuers.
A VC backed issuer holds private information before setting the spread level. An issuer with 'good news' regards it as likely that the bank will also receive 'good news', and he wants the bank to transform this information to investors via separating prices. The high-signal issuer also considers it likely that there are enough high-signal investors such that the IPO will not fail at the risky separation price. An issuer with 'bad news' will always mimic the high-signal issuer. Issuers receive almost always more than 90 percent of the offer revenue and thus have a strong interest in high prices. The reduction in offer price from signaling 'bad news' is thus too costly for the low-signal issuer -even if he is forced to set the price-separation inducing spread as well.
Strong Commercial Banking Ties
Before going public many companies have strong, long-lasting ties with commercial banks, for instance through credit-financing. Thus if a commercial bank organizes a long-term client's IPO, it is reasonable to believe that they truly have identical information. Only recently U.S. regulators allowed commercial banks to offer investment banking services, including IPO underwriting. Our model predicts that gross spreads in such IPOs will be, on average, higher than in uninformed (non-VC backed) issuer's or VC-backed IPOs. In particular, if the bank's/issuer's signal is unfavorable, the issuer is nevertheless willing to set a high spread so that the bank chooses the risky price.
Proposition 7 (Identically Informed Issuers set Higher Average Spreads)
On average, identically informed issuers set higher gross spread levels than uninformed (non-VC backed) or VC backed issuers.
We have shown that uninformed issuers set spreads such that banks with different signals pool in a high, risky offer price. If issuers receive the same signal as the bank, they separate in spreads. In both cases, however, spreads are so high that banks set the high risky price irrespective of their signals. If investors observe the low separation spread they infer that the issuer's inside information is bad. But then even the high risky price at which only high-signal investors buy is relatively low. The issuer thus has to set a relatively high spread to make the bank set the risky price. The opposite effect occurs when the high separation spread is set. However, the first effect dominates so, on average, spreads are higher with identically informed issuers than in non-VC or VC backed offerings.
One may then conjecture that the low-signal issuer contemplates abandoning its commercial bank to look for an independent third-party bank. In equilibrium, it turns out, however, that this deviation is not profitable. Let a deviation be common knowledge. The resulting beliefs will render this deviation unprofitable. It is numerically straightforward to show that the high-signal issuer would not be interested in this move. The best that can happen to him is that he is perceived as a high-signal issuer. But then even the highest expected payoff he will get from working with an independent bank is, in expectation, lower than what he gets from his commercial bank. The reason is that with a third party, there is a risk that the bank gets an unfavorable signal and charges the low price. Thus if the high type would not change, any change of banking-partner would be perceived as coming from a low-signal bank which than would not want to deviate either.
Underpricing
Even though this paper is not mainly concerned with explaining underpricing, in equilibrium the model is consistent with the empirical findings on first-day returns. In the context of this model underpricing is the difference between offer price and market price. We can establish the following proposition. The intuition behind the result follows the Winner's Curse principle: Both types of investors only buy if their expected payoff is non-negative. At p 0,0 the low-signal investor just breaks even in expectation but the high-signal investor expects a strictly positive payoff. At p 1,1 the high-signal investor just breaks even and the low-signal investor abstains. Ex-ante expected payoffs are positive, hence underpricing. If, however, spreads are separating and prices risky, then only investors with the favorable signal buy. With them buying, prices are defined so that they yield zero profit. The uniformed-issuer spread induces a pooling price which by definition yields zero-profit thus zero underpricing to investors, whereas the independently informed issuers' spread is lower and allows underpricing. However, if issues are in the same class (say, they are all VC-backed) but have different gross-spreads, then our model predicts that on average the spread level and underpricing are uncorrelated. Only between issue-classes, that is between non-VC backed and VC backed issues we predict a difference in underpricing in line with recent empirical evidence as presented by Francis and Hasan (2001) .
A Aftermarket Price Formation
An efficient market price aggregates the number of positive and negative signals about the value of the security. The offer demand is published after securities have been issued. If only high-signal investors buy, demand reveals the total number of good (and bad) signals. If all investors order, stated demand is N , securities are allocated at random, but demand is uninformative. Still, high-signal investors expect the security to be worth more than low-signal investors and thus high-signal investors without a shareallotment are willing to buy it from low signal investors with an allotment. Without modelling the price-finding procedure explicitly we assume an intermediate market process takes place that reveals the number of high signals d. For instance, high-signal investors without a share-allotment submit unit market-buy-orders, low-signal investors with a share-allotment submit unit market-sell-orders. All other investors abstain. Letd be the number buyers andS the number of sellers. Then the number of highsignal investors isd+S−S and the market price p m will again depend on the number of favorable signals d.
The updated expectation of V thus becomes the aftermarket price,
Using Bayes' rule, we can express the aftermarket price as
The conditional prior distribution over signals has binomial structure,
Price-information µ about s b is unambiguous in a separating equilibrium. We can therefore replace it with the conditional probability of the bank's signal being correct, q or 1 − q. Then
B Omitted Proofs The Functional Form of Success Probabilities
Variable d denotes the number of orders, i.e. the number of high-signal investors. Then conditional on V = 1, the probability that there are more than S investors is
analogously for V = 0. Suppose the issuer gets no signal or its private signal s f . A bank with signal s b assigns probability α s b ,ν (S) to the event that at least S investors have the favorable signal. If the bank has signal s b and spread information ν, then
Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose p * > p 0,0,ν . At this price only investors with signal s i = 1 buy. A high-signal bank will always set a price where at least investors with signal s i = 1 buy. Hence, investors with signal s i = 1 buy at both prices p * andp * . A low-signal bank can now increase its payoff by setting a higher price as α 0,ν is not affected by this, a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 1
(a) First we show that given Conditions 1 and 2 the only separating equilibrium surviving the intuitive criterion (IC) is the one outlined in Proposition 1(a). We then argue that pooling cannot occur.
Step 1 
By definition of φ 0,ν (p 0,0,ν ) it holds that
so that the low-signal bank would not deviate top. Since max{φ 1,ν (p 0,0,ν ), p 1,0,ν } ≤p, the high-signal bank would also not deviate. Hence this is a PBE. Now consider the application of the IC. Suppose the prevailing price is a high separation pricep =p withp <p ≤ min{p 1,1,ν , φ 0,ν (p 0,0,ν )}. This price is equilibrium dominated for a bank with s b = 0 by definition of φ 0,ν (p 0,0,ν ). The low-signal bank can therefore be excluded the set of potential deviators. The only remaining agent is the high-signal bank. The best response of investors with signal s i = 1 then is to buy atp =p, i.e. B 1 . Hence the PBE withp * =p does not survive the IC. Applying this reasoning repeatedly, all separating prices withp < min{p 1,1,ν , φ 0,ν (p 0,0,ν )} can be eliminated.
Step 2 (Pooling with B 0,1 ) For all investors to buy we must have p ≤ p 0, 1 2 ,ν . Suppose there was deviation to p = φ 1,ν (p 0,
For the low-signal bank this would not be profitable by definition of φ 0,ν (p 0, 1 2 ,ν ). But for some beliefs about the signal of the bank and corresponding best responses, investors with s b = 1 could be better off. The best response for investors with beliefs on the remaining set of types, i.e. µ = 1, however, is B 1 as we have φ 1,ν (p 0, 1 2 ,ν ) < p 1,1,ν . Hence, applying the IC, there cannot be a pooling equilibrium with B 0,1 .
Step 3 (Pooling with B 1 ) We must have p ≤ p 1, 1 2 ,ν . Since φ 0,ν (p 0,0,ν ) > p 1, 1 2 ,ν , the low-signal bank would prefer to deviate to p 0,0,ν , hence this cannot be an equilibrium.
(b) We will first argue that if Condition 1 is not fulfilled each separating equilibrium is payoff dominated by pooling in the risk-less price. Then we will show that also a pooling price at which only high-signal investors buy is payoff dominated. We will finally argue that among all PBE pooling equilibrium prices at which all investors buy only the one outlined in Proposition 1 is payoff dominant.
Step 1 (Separating) If Condition 1 is not fulfilled we have
so the high-signal bank prefers pooling in p 0, 1 2 ,ν to the highest possible separation price p 1,1,ν . Likewise, since p 0, 1 2 ,ν > p 0,0,ν the risk-free pooling price generates higher payoffs for the low-signal bank. Separation is thus always payoff dominated.
Step 2 (Pooling with B 1 ) Since the high-signal bank can profitably deviate from p 1,1,ν it will and can do so from p 1, 1 2 ,ν < p 1,1,ν . Pooling with B 1 can thus be no equilibrium.
Step 3 (Pooling with B 0,1 ) Not even the high-signal bank wants to set a price where only high-signal investors buy. Candidate prices for an equilibrium are thus only prices with B 0,1 . Consider p =p < p 0, 1 2 ,ν . Since both types of banks would prefer p =p withp <p < p 0, 1 2 ,ν Pareto efficiency prescribes that investors must hold µ = 1 2 and thus all investors will buy at p =p. Applying this reasoning repeatedly, all prices with p < p 0, 1 2 ,ν can be eliminated. (c) We will first argue that if Condition 2 is not fulfilled every separating equilibrium is payoff dominated. We will then argue that the only pooling equilibrium in which only high-signal investors buy is the one outlined in Proposition 1. We finally show that pooling in a price where all investors buy cannot be an equilibrium.
Step 1 (Separating) Since Condition 2 does not hold we have
so the low-signal bank will mimic the high-signal bank at any pricep ≥ φ 0,ν (p 0,0,ν ). To uphold separation the high-signal bank must lower its price below φ 0,ν (p 0,0,ν ) < p 1, 1 2 ,ν . However, a high separation price below p 1, 1 2 ,ν cannot be a payoff dominant equilibrium since both types of banks would prefer pooling price p 1, 1 2 ,ν . There can thus be no separating equilibrium.
Step 2 (Pooling with B 1 ) From Step 1 we know that both types of banks prefer pooling inp ∈ [φ 0,ν (p 0,0,ν ), p 1, 1 2 ,ν ] even to the separating equilibrium with the highest possiblep. Consider the candidate pooling pricep withp <p < p 1, 1 2 ,ν . Since both types preferp top payoff dominance prescribes µ = 0.5 and thusp cannot be an equilibrium. Applying this reasoning repeatedly, all prices with p < p 1, 1 2 ,ν can be eliminated. The only pooling equilibrium surviving is thus the one depicted in Proposition 1.
Step 3 (Pooling with B 0,1 ) Suppose, for the moment being, that p 0, 1 2 ,ν is a equilibrium, supported by out-of-equilibriums belief that any deviation is by a low-signal bank. Then consider a deviation to
, and thus, applying the IC, this deviation can only be triggered by a high-signal bank. It is straightforward to check that, numerically, a violation of Condition 2 implies that Condition 1 holds, i.e. φ 1,ν (p 0,
which is increasing in costs C. The largest C so that Condition 2 just holds is C = βS(α 0,ν p 0, 1 2 ,ν − p 0,0,ν /(1 − α 0,ν ). Any C violating Condition 2 is smaller than C. Numerically, then φ 1,ν (p 0, 1 2 ,ν ) < p 1, 1 2 ,ν , thus payoff dominance holds. 
Proof of Proposition 3
To prove this result, we proceed in five steps: In the first we derive the issuer's optimal spread choice under the assumption that spreads are separating. The issuer then chooses the spread that maximizes his payoff; the spread will induce the bank to set either a separating or a pooling price. This step serves as benchmark for comparing deviation payoffs. The first-mover payoff dominance requirement ensures, that in any spread-separating equilibrium, the low-signal issuer will always set his preferred spread, irrespective of the high-signal issuer's choice. In the second step, we argue that the low-signal issuer will always mimic the high-signal issuer's optimal choice. In the third step we show that the high-signal issuer cannot defend separation in spreads by choosing a different level of the spread. We show that neither constellation (price-separation inducing or price-pooling inducing spreads) can be upheld. In the fourth step we show that pooling in spreads is indeed an equilibrium, but it is not unique. In the fifth step we finally argue that only the price-separation inducing spread satisfies the Intuitive Criterion (IC).
The results can only be obtained numerically: When comparing different payoffs, the decisive equations are complicated polynomials, that cannot be expressed in an simple, intuitive form. Explicit solutions, however, can be obtained from the authors upon request. Furthermore, throughout the proof we use the restriction that β < 10 percent. Table 1 describes how an issuer computes his expected payoff. In this proof we let β s ν denote the spread that yields separation given spread information ν.
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Step 1: Suppose first that the spread is separating and indicates s f = 1, so that ν = 1. The issuer has the choice between expected profits in separation, low riskless pooling, and high risky pooling. For given parameters q, C, N , the issuer will always choose the spread with maximal expected payoffs. The following two inequalities always holds when C/N < R 1 (q). Restrictions R(q), guaranteeing β < 10 percent, are stated explicitly the end of the Appendix.
1. Pooling in p 1, 1 2 ,1 is always better than separation in p 1,1,1 and p 0,0,1 as
2. Pooling in p 1, 1 2 ,1 is better than pooling in p 0,
Suppose now that the spread triggers ν = 0. Again, we have to compare expected profits. All the 11 We emphasize that this is not the same as the spreads defined in Subsection 4.2. Nevertheless, for the purposes of exposition in the proof this notation is best; since the spreads β s ν as defined here are no equilibria, there should be no confusion. Details of the β's used in this proof are placed below.
inequalities hold if we restrict C/N < R 1 (q).
1. Pooling in p 1, 1 2 ,0 is better than separation in p 1,1,0 and p 0,0,0 if
2. Pooling in p 1, 1 2 ,0 is better than pooling in p 0,
Thus if spreads are separating, irrespective of the spread-information inducing risky, high price-pooling is better than both price-separation and low price-pooling.
Step 2: We now show that the low-signal issuer will always mimic the high-signal issuer, and that defending separation is too costly. It is profitable to mimic the high-signal issuer in β
Numerically the deviation profit is always higher, i.e. spread-separating in β p 1 , β p 0 cannot be an equilibrium.
Step 3: The high-signal issuer's defenses against mimicking have to be analyzed for any of the three candidate equilibria: price-pooling inducing β p 1 , price-separating inducing β s 1 , and risk-less pooling inducing β = 0 would be defended by setting higher βs. However, none of these turn out to be feasible.
(a) Defending Price-Separation. The lowest spreadβ for which the low-signal issuer will not mimic the price-separation inducing spread any longer, is given by
Solving forβ, numericallyβ exceeds by far 10 percent (and thus lies outside the relevant parameter region). It also exceeds β p 1 , which brings us to the next case. (b) Defending Risky Price-Pooling. If the high-signal issuer setsβ > β p 1 the low-signal issuer will no longer mimic if
Solving forβ, numericallyβ exceeds by far 10 percent (i.e. lies outside the relevant parameter region). (c) Defending Riskless Price-Pooling. If the high-signal issuer setsβ ∈ (0, β s 1 ) the low-signal issuer will no longer mimic if
Solving forβ, numerically it exceeds by far 10 percent (i.e. lies outside the relevant parameter region). Thus, there is no spread-separating equilibrium.
Step 4: Consider now the spread-pooling equilibria. As usual, there are three candidate spreads: Furthermore, numerically for all q, the high type prefers to deviate toβ(q) if he is perceived to be the high type, whereas the low type prefers the current equilibrium. Hence there is a deviation that, in the best of all worlds for beliefs, is only profitable for the high type issuer, thus β p 1 2 fails the IC.
Consider now the price-separation-inducing spread and construct the same deviationβ(q) as above. It turns out, however that for every q and any for everyβ < 10%,
Anyβ satisfying this equation with equality could be taken as a benchmark for deviation-considerations. However, since there's no feasibleβ that satisfies our restriction and equation (35) with equality, the out-of-equilibrium belief of low-type deviation does not fail the IC.
As a consequence of all this, the only equilibrium that satisfies the IC and payoff dominance is pooling in spreads β s 1 2 which induce price-separation. In the proof we used the following threshold values for spreads. They are computed in the same way as demonstrated in Subsection 5.1. Note that β s ν is not the same as the ones used in the next proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
If the issuer signals his information, the bank's price choice carries no extra value. Thus in prices, µ is substituted with a diamond. For the bank's probability of a successful IPO, spreads do not carry information, thus in α j,ν , j = 0, 1, spread information ν is substituted with a diamond. In Subsection 4.2, Equation (5) we have already described the spreads which induce banks to choose risky prices: (1) The high-signal bank chooses risky p 1,⋄,1 with B 1 if it is offered at least β 
First, we have to show that both types of issuer actually do want the respective bank to set those risky prices.
(1) The high-signal issuer prefers the high-signal bank to set p 1,⋄,1 and not p 0,⋄,1 if its expected revenue is higher at the risky price, α 1 (1 − β)p 1,⋄,1 S ≥ p 0,⋄,1 S. (Note that β = 0 is sufficient for the bank to set the risk-free price.) Solving for β yields that the spread minimal separating has to satisfy
Applying the same reasoning to the low-signal issuer, he prefers the low-signal bank to set risky p 1,⋄,0 and not p 0,⋄,0 if α 0 (1 − β)p 1,⋄,0 S ≥ p 0,⋄,0 S. Thus the separating threshold β s 0 has to satisfy 12 12 If any of these restrictions on C/N is satisfied strictly, the necessary spreads can be set lower.
We restrict the analysis to the empirically relevant parameter space where spreads do not exceed 10 percent. Since we know β s 0 > β p > β s 1 we impose β s 0 < 10%. This translates into any β has to be smaller than (4q − 1 − 5q 2 + 2q 3 )/5(1 − 2q + 2q 2 ) =: R 5 (q). Numerically it is easy to check that
Proof of Proposition 7
From Propositions 2 and 4 we know that an uninformed issuer always sets β p ⋄ ; an identically informed issuer with signal s b = 0 sets β s 0 , if he has signal s b = 1 he sets β s 1 . Ex ante, the identically informed issuer gets either signal with equal probability. Thus for the claim to be true it must hold that 1 2 β
Checking this numerically, the inequality holds if C/N < R 1 (q). By Proposition 6, the VC-backed issuer sets even lower spreads.
Proof of Proposition 8
(a)-(c) are clear from the text. For (d), issues with uninformed issuers or with same-signal issuers are not underpriced. For issues with independently informed issuers, underpricing is proportional to 1 − α 1,
, and the equilibrium spread is β decreases (increases). However, for q < 3/4, underpricing is increasing in q, for q > 3/4, it is decreasing. If precision q is symmetrically distributed around 3/4, for two arbitrary q, on average it is equally likely that the lower spread has higher or lower underpricing. With asymmetric distributions, of course, this result does not hold.
List of Restrictions:
R 1 = 2q(2q − 1) 2 (q − 1) 2 (1 − q 2 + q)/(4q − 9q 2 + 19q 3 − 25q 4 + 17q 5 − 2q 6 − 1) R 2 = 2(q − 1)(1 − q − 3q 2 + 2q 3 )(2q − 1)/3q(1 − 2q + 2q 2 ) R 3 = (2q − 1) 2 /2q, R 4 = 2q(2q − 1) 2 (q − 1) 2 /(1 − 2q + 2q 2 ) 2 R 5 = (4q − 1 − 5q 2 + 2q 3 )/5(1 − 2q + 2q 2 )
C Threshold Prices [Potentially not for publication]
Denote by p si,µ,ν the maximum price at which an investor with signal s i and price-information µ and spread information ν buys, given all investors withs i ≥ s i buy. At this price the investor's expected return from buying the security is zero, normalizing outside investment opportunities accordingly. Define ψ(1|1, 1, ν) := Pr(V = 1|s i = 1, µ = 1, ν) and ψ(0|1, 1, ν) := Pr(V = 0|s i = 1, µ = 1, ν). Consider now the structure of the conditional distribution f (d − 1|V ). For V = 1, this is a binomial distribution over {0, . . . , N − 1} with center (N − 1)q, and likewise for V = 0 with center (N − 1)(1 − q). Since by Assumption 2, N is 'large enough' for every q, f (d − 1|1) = 0 for d < N/2 and f (d|0) = 0 for d > N/2. When combining both f (d − 1|1) and f (d − 1|0), we obtain a bi-modal function. Knowing f (d − 1|V ), we can find the probability that d − 1 other have a favorable signal to be g(d|s i , µ(p), ν(β)) := V ∈V Pr(V |s i , µ(p), ν(β)) · f (d|V ).
Thus in g(·|s i , µ, ν), investors' posterior distribution over demands, f (d − 1|1) and f (d − 1|0) are weighted with ψ(1|s i , µ, ν) and ψ(0|s i , µ, ν). Assumption 2 now satisfies two purposes. The first is to ensure that we pick N large enough, so that the two modes do not overlap. The second can be seen as follows.
Lemma 2 For any q > 1 2 , there exists a number of investors N (q), such that p m (d) · g(d|s i , µ, ν) ∈ {0, g(d|s i , µ, ν)} almost everywhere.
The lemma states that market prices are mostly 0 or 1, if they are not, then the weight of this demand is negligible. To see this consider the following heuristic argument. If only investors with favorable signals order, then for a high-signal investor, at price p his rationalexpectation payoff from buying has to be non-negative,
Likewise for the respective low-signal investors when all investors order in which case the summation runs from 1 to N , and s i = 1 is replaced by s i = 0. Using Lemma 2 we can determine the threshold prices as follows. Consider first p 1,1,ν . 
Consider now the case for p 0,0,ν . At this price all agents receive the security with equal probability and we sum from 0 to N − 1. 
Likewise we have We will now derive approximate closed form solutions so that we can solve our model analytically. In this appendix we let d denotes the number of other investors with favorable information -this contrasts the exposition of the main text, but it simplifies the notation here. First consider the strategy of agent number N . There are N − 1 other investors. Given that he invests and the true value is, say, V = 1, then by the law of large numbers, demand/the number of favorable signals will always be larger than N/2. Furthermore, the market price is almost surely p m (d) = 1. If d others order, then when buying he gets the asset with probability 1/(d + 1). Thus his payoff for price p
To compute the sum we proceed in a similar manner as one would to compute the expected value of a binomial distribution: First observe that because N is large,
Then we can compute
In the second step we made a change of variable, l = d + 1, but through this change, we had to subtract the element of the sum for l = 0. Consequently, for large N , we have
Using the same arguments, we could also show that
Use now familiar notation to denote the combination of private and public beliefs φ s,µ . For the time being, assume the issuer is uninformed so that ν is replaced with a diamond. Recall that we can write p 1,1,⋄ as p 1,1,⋄ = 1 + ℓ(1, ⋄)
What we now need to find is a closed form for
For increasing N one can see that 
Putting it all together, we obtain
By the same token, we get 
The information content of a high pooling price is 1/2, and knowing this information, the probability of the offering being successful is 3/4. Thus the interpretation of risky prices is thus the ratio of the expected liquidation value given price-and spread-information to the share of successful offerings given this information p 1,µ,ν = Pr(V = 1 | µ, ν) Pr(IPO successful | µ, ν) .
